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Art helps Nature, by reducing such wild, austere, and dangerous 
Ground, into a pliable, fine, fertile and, sound Earth. 
–William Ellis1 
  
Without the benefit of statutory or regulatory definitions of “nature,” courts 
and federal agencies have long improvised, roughly applying an “I’ll know it 
when I see it” approach.2  Such an approach implicitly invokes cultural norms, 
which in Western tradition means defining nature by setting it against man and 
man’s interventions.3  As a result, litigation across a variety of fields defines 
what is “natural” by the extent of intervention and manipulation something 
experiences.4  The Supreme Court recently grappled with this problem.  In Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,5 the Court addressed the 
question of whether isolating DNA is an “inventive act” that entitles the first 
person to isolate DNA with the right to a patent.6  The Court applied the “law of 
nature exception” to patentability, which exempts laws of nature, abstract ideas, 
                                                 
 1. WILLIAM ELLIS, AGRICULTURE IMPROV’D: OR, THE PRACTICE OF HUSBANDRY 
DISPLAY’D 43 (London, T. Osborne 1745). 
 2. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice Stewart 
noted that that even though he could not define “pornography,” he “know[s] it when [he] see[s] it . 
. . .”  Id. 
 3. See Franklin Ginn & David Demeritt, Nature: A Contested Concept, in KEY CONCEPTS 
IN GEOGRAPHY 300, 302–03 (Gill Valentine et al. eds., 2009) (noting that nature is defined as the 
absence of “any trace of humans and their artifice”). 
 4. See infra Part I.A (summarizing the cases and regulations addressing use of the term 
“natural”). 
 5. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 6. See id. at 2114–15. 
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and natural phenomena.7  The case highlights the difficulty of determining just 
how much human action makes something “unnatural.”8 
The stakes are high, because understanding what it means for a product to be 
“all natural” is extremely valuable in the marketplace and of great significance 
to everyday consumers.9  For example, natural products are hot commodities in 
the marketplace,10 which makes defining what is natural a priority.  
Simultaneously, the current rules regarding natural products, or the lack thereof, 
send many corporate competitors to court over what constitutes a “natural” 
product.11  The National Products Association made “defining natural” a priority 
                                                 
 7. Id. at 2117. 
 8. See id. at 2119–20 (limiting the holding to isolated DNA and failing to extend it to cases 
in which a company is seeking a method patent, the application of knowledge is at issue, or DNA 
is altered).  Notably, the Court’s attempt to define “natural” in Myriad Genetics is viewed by some 
as the most significant decision in the field of intellectual property in 2013.  See, e.g., Warren 
Woessner, Top Ten Intellectual Property Stories from 2013, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/top-ten-intellectual-property-stories-2013. 
 9. Courts hold that consumers are entitled to rely on those “all natural” big-print 
representations on the front of packaging.  See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 
939 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “reasonable consumers should [not] be expected to look beyond 
misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the truth”). 
 10. See ERIN SILVA ET AL., UW-MADISON CTR. FOR INTEGRATED AGRIC. SYS., ORGANIC 
AGRICULTURE IN WISCONSIN: 2012 STATUS REPORT 12 (2012), available at http://www.ci 
as.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/org12finalnewlowres021612.pdf.  Since at least 2000, 
substantial organic and natural food markets have emerged within the United States with an average 
growth rate of almost seventeen percent per year between 2000 and 2010.  Id.  American organic 
food sales make up almost half of sales worldwide, and the global organic food market more than 
tripled between 2000 and 2009.  Id.  See also Press Release, Organic Trade Ass’n, Consumer-
Driven U.S. Organic Market Surpasses $31 Billion in 2011 (Apr. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.organicnewsroom.com/2012/04/us_consumerdriven_organic_mark.html;  
Dana Hunsinger Benbow, Natural, Organic Items Grab Bigger Share in Supermarkets, USA 
TODAY (July 8, 2012, 2:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/story/ 
2012-07-07/natural-organic-groceries/56085280/1. 
 11. For example, Naked Juice settled a class action regarding product labeling.  See Pappas 
v. Naked Juice Co. of Gendora, Inc., No. LA CV11-08276 JAK, 2012 WL 1925598, at *1–2 (C.D. 
Cal. May 14, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 14-55289 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2014).  The German 
chocolate company, Ritter, is also defending an accusation that it used synthetic ingredients.  See 
Dan Charles, Top German Chocolate Maker Fights for its ‘Natural’ Reputation, NPR (Dec. 24, 
2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/12/23/256587064/top-german-chocolate-
maker-fights-for-its-natural-reputation.  Buitoni pastas just avoided a class action suit over its all 
natural labels.  See Pelayo v. Nestlé USA, Inc., No. CV 13-5213-JFW(AJWx), 2013 WL 5764644 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (dismissing a complaint against Nestlé that alleged the all natural labels 
on Buitoni pastas were deceptive). 
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for 2014,12 while major publications such as Forbes,13 Newsweek,14 and the Wall 
Street Journal15 cover stories about confusion and frustration for both consumers 
and industries.16  Even courts tire of litigation that could be avoided with some 
assistance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Some judges stay 
claims and refer the matters to the FDA for an administrative ruling.17  
Unfortunately, the road forward is not quite as clear as these cases might suggest 
because the FDA is not the only cook in the kitchen.  Defining “nature” impacts 
disparate areas of law including patents, gemstone classification, cosmetics, and 
international trade.  This broad range of application implicates numerous federal 
agencies, each of which struggles to create its own definition of nature, leading 
to structural isolation from each agency’s counterparts. 
In defining “nature,” many agencies fail to reference the substantial literature 
discussing what is “natural” from historical and social science perspectives, even 
though the literature insightfully isolates the philosophical quandaries that 
generate very real-world problems.18  According to many scholars, our cultural 
history generates definitions that rely on a man/nature dichotomy, and that 
dichotomy creates important social consequences.19  From a legal perspective, 
critical social consequences of the dichotomy include downplaying the potential 
                                                 
 12. John Shaw, Defining ‘Natural’ is a Priority for NPA in 2014, NUTRA INGREDIENTS-
USA (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.nutraingredients-usa.com/Regulation/Defining-natural-is-a-
priority-for-NPA-in-2014. 
 13. See James McWilliams, With the ‘All Natural’ Label under Fire, Consumers are Left in 
the Dark, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmcwilliams/ 
2013/11/14/with-the-all-natural-label-under-fire-consumers-are-left-in-the-dark/ (noting that many 
companies stopped using the term “natural” because of its vagueness, which leads to the possibility 
of lawsuits). 
 14. See Matthew Mientka, The Unnatural Death of ‘Natural’ Labeling, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 
2013, http://www.newsweek.com/unnatural-death-natural-labeling-207164 (explaining that the 
word natural has no legal definition, which allows food producers to use it deceptively). 
 15. See Mike Esterl, The Natural Evolution of Food Labels, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2013, at B1 
(explaining that food companies are removing the word natural from food labels because they fear 
litigation). 
 16. Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut introduced a Senate bill that, if passed, will 
strengthen labeling requirements for foods.  See Food Labeling Modernization Act of 2013, S. 
1653, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (2013). 
 17. See Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185-JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118225, 
at *29–30 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (granting a stay of the action and referring the matter to the 
FDA for an administrative determination regarding whether the soup at issue could be labeled 
natural); Van Atta v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-02815-MSK-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
118137, at *10 (D. Colo. July 18, 2013) (granting a stay of the action until the FDA issued a 
recommendation requested in an earlier case), accepted in part, rejected in part, and stay granted 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119119 (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2013); Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 
YGR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97207, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (referring the issue to the FDA 
to determine whether products with bioengineered seed can be labeled natural). 
 18. See Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 301, 304–05 (discussing different theories of nature 
and movements that addressed the definition of “nature”). 
 19. Id. at 303 (noting that the difference in cultural approaches creates ambiguity over how 
the idea of nature should be interpreted). 
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for man to deeply change elements of nature, such as the climate.  
Simultaneously, because the man/nature dichotomy is false, agencies are left to 
define nature by looking to a nuanced scale of human actions such as isolating, 
discovering, purifying, locating, synthesizing, and fermenting.  The proliferation 
of limited definitions of what is natural within narrow legal spheres means each 
agency individually struggles with measuring the kind, quality, and quantity of 
human modifications and interventions to define “nature.”20  A comparative 
history of the jurisprudence of defining “nature,” augmented with reflections 
from historical and sociological literature, is critical to developing a thoughtful 
and reasonably consistent narrative within the law.  Such a narrative will create 
predictable outcomes. 
This Article analyzes historical approaches to defining “nature” and suggests 
that a new definition of “nature,” based on property rights, should be adopted.  
Disentangling historical approaches reveals the enduring challenges of using a 
scale ranging from what originates in nature to the artificial in determining what 
is truly natural.  While using such a scale may be unavoidable within the 
industries of foods, cosmetics, and drugs, improvements can be made to promote 
predictability and consistency.  In other industries, the language of property 
rights may be a more appropriate substitute for defining “nature,” similarly 
increasing both predictability and consistency.  In any event, such interventions 
pave the way for avoiding the socio-cultural consequences of defining “nature” 
as the exclusion of man. 
Part I of the Article discusses historical efforts to define, or avoid defining, 
“nature” across federal agencies.  It briefly considers the intersections of these 
definitions in addition to the impact of disparate approaches.  Part II analyzes 
the challenges agencies face in defining “nature.”  The analysis begins with 
investigating how the natural/human binary21 contrasts with the human action 
spectrum and considers how evidence of long-standing human intervention in 
ecosystems demonstrates the difficulty of applying the spectrum in the real 
world.  Part III turns to history, philosophy, and the social sciences to investigate 
critiques of the binary man/nature definition and its cultural consequences.  Part 
IV applies these critiques to the problem of creating a legal definition of “nature” 
while taking into account the social consequences of the binary man/nature 
definition, such as the pressure to justify human interventions in ecosystems in 
all circumstances.  The Article concludes in Part V by suggesting that definitions 
of “nature” should rely on the language of property rights rather than the 
man/nature binary. 
                                                 
 20. See, e.g., id. (discussing the Food Standards Agency (FSA)’s struggle to define “natural”). 
 21. In addition to patent law, binaries, or “bilateral dialogues,” also exist in the field of 
geography, in which geographers increasingly recognize binaries as significant to the development 
of the field and to popular understandings of key geographical concepts.  See Paul Cloke & Ron 
Johnston, Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries, in SPACES OF GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT: 
DECONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY’S BINARIES 1, 11 (Paul Cloke & Ron Johnston eds., 
2005). 
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I.  LEGISLATING NATURE ACROSS DIVERSE AREAS OF LAW 
The natural designation impacts monetary profits, whether in patent law, 
where the exception can defeat patentability, or in the manufacture and sale of 
products, where the designation commands an increasing portion of markets.22  
In any event, federal agencies increasingly tangle with the question of what is 
natural and are beginning to elaborate upon, even if only informally, definitions 
of this key concept. 
A.  Non-Patentability of Natural Phenomena: Distinguishing Between What 
Occurs Naturally and the Human Application of Natural Phenomena 
Section 101 of the Patent Act states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”23  In light of Congressional intention 
that the Act “include anything under the sun that is made by man,”24 the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Act broadly,25 but has excluded “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent coverage.26  This exclusion exists 
because these concepts form the basis of all scientific and technological 
processes.27  The Court is careful to caution, however, that “too broad an 
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law[] 
[because] all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”28 
While the Court has not attempted to specifically articulate a definition, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) defines a natural thing as 
“the handiwork of nature” and something that “occurs without the hand of 
                                                 
 22. Bryan Resnick, Why is Myriad Genetics Still Filing Patent Suits for Breast-Cancer Tests?, 
NAT’L J., Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/why-is-myriad-genetics-still-
filing-patent-suits-for-breast-cancer-tests-20130808. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 24. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399. 
 25. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such expansive 
terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ 
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”). 
 26. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).  This Article focuses on the natural 
phenomena and law of nature exception, which is distinct from the “abstract ideas” exception.  See 
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 954 F. Supp. 2d 509, 525–26 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (finding 
that defendant was only asserting “application of the ‘abstract ideas’ exception” with regard to 
certain claims, and advancing other claims on the basis of different exceptions).  Similarly, this 
Article pursues the law of nature exception only to the extent that it comingles or overlaps with the 
natural phenomena exception.  Other cases more squarely within the law of nature, line, such as 
those involving mathematical formulas, are omitted.  See, e.g., Oleksy v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 06-
C-01245, 2013 WL 3233259, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013) (analyzing, in part, whether a 
mathematical formula included an inventive step that was patentable). 
 27. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 28. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
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man.”29  This definition suggests that something must occur in nature or must 
exist without significant human alteration or manufacture to be natural. This 
touchstone definition for what is “natural” references the spectrum of potential 
human actions with respect to a process or product, which ranges from natural 
to artificial.  As a result, this definition reflects a dichotomy between those 
products and ideas that have nominal modifications and those that are 
substantially the result of human efforts.  A threshold exists along this spectrum 
that must be surpassed for patent eligibility.30  Further complicating the matter, 
the Court recognizes that application of a “law of nature or mathematical 
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection.”31 
The Court interpreted the nature exception in a series of cases over a span of 
fifty years: Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,32 Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty,33 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.34  
In Funk Bros., the Court considered whether a mixture of different, naturally 
occurring, bacteria that could inoculate plant seeds fell within the law of nature 
exception.35  In this context, the Court said the patentee merely made a 
“discovery” by locating an “unknown phenomenon of nature,” which needed to 
be used for a new purpose or applied to something further in order to become 
patentable.36  Thus, although Funk Brothers used their discovery to create a new 
mixture of bacteria, the Court refused the patent, finding that the new mixture 
was merely a discovery because its natural behaviors remain unchanged.37  The 
Court suggested that a patent may have been properly issued if Funk Brothers 
                                                 
 29. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2016.01(III) (8th ed. 2001); see also Ex parte Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 413, 414 (B.P.A.I. 1941) (rejecting the patent claim for a fresh shrimp product as a natural 
substance, noting the claimant’s design “is still in its natural state which has been changed in no 
manner”). 
 30. See Krysta Kauble, Patenting Everything Under the Sun: Invoking the First Amendment 
to Limit the Use of Gene Patents, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1123, 1125–26 (2011) (highlighting differences 
of opinion with regard to when something experiences so much human intervention that it is no 
longer patentable, particularly with regard to gene sequences). 
 31. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.  Further, “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression 
of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge 
of scientific truth may be.”  Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 
(1939). 
 32. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 33. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 34. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 35. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 36. Id. at 130 (noting that such a discovery is not entitled to a patent, because the discovery 
could have been made by anyone, and the bacteria already existed in nature). 
 37. Id. at 131 (stating the bacteria’s  “use in combination does not improve in any way their 
natural functioning.  They serve the ends nature originally provided”).  The Court acknowledged 
that although mixing the bacteria required skill, it did not change the characteristics of the bacteria.  
Id. at 132. 
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applied the discovery to create a state of inhibition or non-inhibition in the 
bacteria,38 improve the bacteria’s natural functioning,39 or create new bacteria.40 
Over thirty years later, in Chakrabarty, the Court considered whether a patent 
for a live, human-made, genetically engineered bacterium that could break down 
crude oil was prohibited under the laws of nature exception.41  The Court 
distinguished this patent application from the patent in Funk Bros. on the 
grounds that the bacterium at issue was not naturally occurring.42  The Court 
stated that, with regard to patent eligibility, the distinction is not between living 
and inanimate objects, but between naturally occurring phenomenon and 
products created through human ingenuity and invention.43 
More recently, the Mayo Court considered whether a process that helps 
doctors determine whether a drug dosage level is too low or too high for patients 
with autoimmune disease fell within the law of nature exception.44  The Court 
determined that the patent claims involved laws of nature because the 
relationship between the dosage level and its effect on the human body was an 
entirely natural process.45  The Court reiterated the need for human application 
of naturally occurring phenomena in order for a patent to issue,46 but only 
vaguely defined an “application,” stating that the process would require 
“additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than 
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”47 
Unfortunately, the line between natural phenomenon and its application 
remains unclear.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Myriad Genetics 
                                                 
 38. See id. at 130 (noting Funk Bros. “does not create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition 
in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable”). 
 39. See id. at 131. 
 40. See id. (finding there was “no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement 
of the range of their utility”). 
 41. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 42. See id. at 309–10 (stating that, rather, the bacterium was “a product of human ingenuity”). 
 43. Id. at 313.  The Funk Bros. decision makes sense to any cook: yeast, flour, and warm 
water nearly magically yield an entirely different substance when heated, but little of the magic is 
attributable to the cook when his actions are compared with the law of nature with regard to the 
creation of bread.  See H.E. JACOB, SIX THOUSAND YEARS OF BREAD: ITS HOLY AND UNHOLY 
HISTORY 17 (Richard & Clara Winston trans., Lyons & Burford 1997) (1944).  Is Chakrabarty 
different in a way that we can clearly articulate, simply because the “mixing” occurred within the 
organism and on a microscopic scale? 
 44. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
 45. Id. at 1296–97 (explaining that the process Prometheus sought to patent involved the 
“relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a 
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm[,]” and that the metabolization of 
the drug by the human body was a natural process). 
 46. See id. at 1294 (emphasizing the need for an “inventive concept” to ensure nature itself is 
not being patented). 
 47. Id. at 1297. 
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emphasizes the problem.48  The Court began by articulating the law of nature 
exception to patent eligibility, explaining the rationale behind the exception and 
noting the need to have a patent policy that provides incentives to spur invention, 
but simultaneously does not inhibit the exchange of information.49  The Court 
then considered whether Myriad’s patents were for a new and useful substance 
or were not patent eligible because they fell under the natural laws exception.50  
While the Court eventually acknowledged the need to evaluate the claim under 
the law of nature exception, it avoided offering any explanation of how to locate 
the threshold of sufficient human creation/application that distinguishes 
invention from natural phenomena.51  The Court explained that Myriad’s 
isolation of a useful gene was important, but there was no “act of invention” that 
would be patentable because there was no creation.52  Such characterization, 
however, fails to adequately characterize actions such as isolating a gene and 
identifying the consequences of particular mutations of the gene, which might 
resemble both discovery and something more. 
In Myriad Genetics, the Court struggled to choose a verb that would precisely 
characterize Myriad’s actions with regard to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  
Despite noting that Myriad “separat[ed] [a] gene from its surrounding genetic 
material”53 and “isolate[ed]” the relevant DNA,54 the Court eventually found 
that Myriad only discovered the location of the genetic sequence of BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 and did not change the genes’ characteristics.55  In actuality, by 
“uncovering” the genes, Myriad did more than simply find their location; Myriad 
connected the genes with a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer, which 
                                                 
 48. See Russell E. Cass & Linda R. Friedlieb, Myriad Illuminates High Court’s Approach To 
Section 101, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (July 8, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.sidley.com/files/ 
Publication/4a0455a1-3c94-4805-bf1b-b38c1587d83d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7c5c 
a151-4633-421d-a72c-bf7b756f2fc5/Cass%20Friedlieb%20Law360.pdf (noting that after Myriad 
Genetics, it remains unclear how much human application is required for something to become 
patent eligible, though it is clear that the human intervention must be more than added effort, a 
routine, or something that is useful to a limited group, such as physicians). 
 49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) 
(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1305). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 2120 (limiting the Court’s holding to the finding that genes are not patentable 
and refusing to address what is needed to show application of knowledge sufficient to obtain a 
patent).  See also Cass & Friedlieb, supra note 48 (explaining the Court has left open the question 
of what additional features are needed to confer patent eligibility to a natural product). 
 52. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
 53. Id. at 2117. 
 54. Id. at 2118.  Notably, other courts find isolation to be a creative act worthy of patent.  
Michael Powell, Supreme Court Rules That a Naturally Occurring DNA Segment is Not Patent 
Eligible, but cDNA May Be Patent Eligible, LEXOLOGY (July 2, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=c9022fa6-7323-4063-a751-80e73b66e7f3 (noting that the European Court of 
Justice, the highest Court in Europe, confirmed the legality of patenting isolated genes). 
 55. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
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now allows the company to accurately predict cancer diagnoses and prognoses.56  
The testing process required significant monitoring of populations and the 
collection of a massive database.57  While individuals and their health outcomes 
existed before and without Myriad Genetics, the creation of the database 
involved hundreds, if not thousands, of creative decisions required to obtain 
precisely the data needed and to ensure its statistical validity.58 
The Myriad Genetics Court compared Myriad’s gene isolation to the Funk 
Brothers’ combination of naturally occurring bacteria to inoculate plants, and 
found that both fell within the law of nature exception.59  The Court appears to 
consider Myriad’s actions as a roughly parallel opposite of those in Funk Bros.: 
separation rather than combination.  Notably, the Court did not consider how 
different the applicants’ actions in Funk Bros. and Myriad Genetics might be in 
terms of the complexity and creativity.  Effort does not appear as a part of the 
analysis when determining whether there is an “application” beyond discovery 
of the natural phenomenon. 
The Court also compared Myriad’s actions to scientists’ actions in 
Chakrabarty, where the patent applicant modified a bacterium by adding 
plasmids, giving it the ability to break down crude oil.60  In Chakrabarty, the 
Court held that a patent could issue because the bacterium was entirely new and 
had distinctive characteristics that did not exist in nature, unlike the discovery 
in Myriad Genetics in which nothing new was created.61 
Prior to Myriad Genetics, the Court seemed to suggest that the line 
distinguishing between natural phenomenon and application might be whether 
the discovery advanced a “new and useful end,”62 but Myriad Genetics suggests 
the analysis is less clear.  The Myriad Genetics Court acknowledged that the 
discovery was of a “useful gene,” but said that was not enough for a patent, 
noting “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by 
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”63 
Without a definition of what it means to go beyond the discovery of natural 
phenomena, it is likely that future legal battles will focus on the critical verbs 
used in the patent application.  Similarly, Myriad Genetics’ method of 
navigating the natural phenomena exception creates a conflict between that 
decision and the traditional exception recognized in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. 
                                                 
 56. See id. at 2117 n.4.  See also Gina Kolata, DNA Project Aims to Make Public a Company’s 
Data on Cancer Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, at A14 (describing Myriad’s database of DNA 
changes that can predict a person’s cancer risk). 
 57. Kolata, supra note 56, at A14. 
 58. See id. (explaining that Myriad performed “millions of tests” to compile the database). 
 59. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
 60. Id. at 2116–17. 
 61. Id. at 2117. 
 62. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 63. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
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Mulford Co.,64 a case in which a patent was granted for isolating and purifying 
a substance that was found in nature.65  Although some argue that such purified 
substances are naturally occurring and therefore not patentable,66 many courts 
have held that purified forms of substances are not natural and can be patented.67  
For example, when reviewing a patent for ultramarine, the Fourth Circuit found 
that “[t]he fact[] [] that a new and useful product is the result of processes of 
extraction, concentration and purification of natural materials does not defeat its 
patentability.”68  The court suggested that the creation of a new and useful 
product is vital to patentability, noting that the purified fermentates at issue 
would be useless on their own without extra steps making them medically 
useful.69  Similarly, the D.C. District Court emphasized utility over creativity 
when it acknowledged that l-arterenol is naturally found with other compounds 
throughout the body, but held that its existence in a purified form was patentable 
because it is only usable in its purified form.70 
The memorable “aspirin case,” Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfield 
Co.,71 which questioned the validity of a patent issued for aspirin, also dealt with 
whether the product was “new.”72  Though novel to Europeans and their 
descendants, aspirin was used for centuries by Native American tribes as a 
remedy for fevers and is found in willow bark in a less purified form.73  The 
patent was challenged in 1910 when a competitor developed a competing 
                                                 
 64. 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 65. See id. at 497.  Traditionally, courts find purification of naturally occurring products 
patentable.  See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958) 
(allowing a patent where new products were created through the fermentation process); In re Bergy, 
596 F.2d 952, 996 & n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (finding a pure culture of Streptomyces vellosus used to 
create antibiotic patentable); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reasoning 
that the purification of prostaglandin compounds was new enough to merit a patent); Merck & Co. 
v. Chase Chem. Co., 273 F. Supp. 68, 69, 89–90 (D.N.J. 1967) (upholding the issuance of a patent 
for Vitamin B-12 because the product was sufficiently new); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Watson, 135 F. 
Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955) (upholding a patent for purified 1-arterenol although it existed in 
nature in some form). 
 66. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1401–01. 
 67. See sources cited supra note 65.  The low level of human intervention needed to purify a 
substance would suggest that the courts focus more on the “useful” aspect than the “new” aspect of 
patentable products, a theory that provides support for the Myriad Genetics decision.  See Merck & 
Co., 253 F.2d at 164 (discussing the relative ease of purifying a substance compared to creating a 
new substance). 
 68. Merck & Co., 253 F.2d at 163. 
 69. Id. at 164. 
 70. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955). 
 71. 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910). 
 72. Id. at 702–03. 
 73. See Eric T. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 19, 34 n.107 (2011); Willow Branches and Other Twigs and Roots, NATIVETECH, 
http://www.nativetech.org/willow/willow.htm (last visited May 26, 2014). 
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generic version.74  The Seventh Circuit found that aspirin was a “new thing.”75  
The primary justification was that the patent holder produced a new and useful 
compound that had widespread medical value.76  Cases like Kuehmsted show 
that, historically, courts have been willing to grant patents for naturally 
occurring substances in a purified form where the substance is used for 
something new and useful, and have emphasized the utility of the product rather 
than the level of human intervention required for its purification.  Myriad 
Genetics, however, suggests that human intervention may now be essential to 
patentability. 
B.  The FDA and the Regulation of Natural Foods and Cosmetics 
Within federal agencies, the growing demand for natural foods has spurred 
the necessity to define what is “natural.”  Consumers rely heavily on such terms 
when making product choices; products labeled “100% natural” are believed to 
be the best available, followed closely by those labeled “all natural 
ingredients.”77 
When the Food Safety and Inspection Service published Policy Memorandum 
055 in 1982, it ushered in the modern guidance system.78  For the purpose of 
food labeling, this system defined anything that contained “artificial or 
synthetic” ingredients as unnatural.79  In 1991, the FDA established an informal 
policy that defined natural foods as those in which “nothing artificial or synthetic 
(including colors regardless of source) is included in, or has been added to, the 
product that would not normally be expected to be there.”80  The FDA did not 
elaborate on the definitions of “artificial” or “synthetic,” even though these 
terms form a key part of the definition of “natural” in the informal policy.81  The 
FDA’s informal policy is deemed merely an advisory opinion that does not carry 
the force of law.82  The FDA also does not have an informal definition of natural 
                                                 
 74. Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 702–03. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 705. 
 77. Josh Ashley, A Bittersweet Deal for Consumers: The Unnatural Application of 
Preemption to High Fructose Corn Syrup Labeling Claims, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 235, 236 (2010) 
(showing that 31.3% of consumers prefer “100% natural” products, compared to 25.4% preferring 
products containing “all natural ingredients” and 14.2% preferring “100% organic” products). 
 78. See A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies, 
Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 253, 262–63 
(2007). 
 79. Id. at 263. 
 80. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of 
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991). 
 81. Id.  The FDA sought input from consumers on how to accurately define “natural,” if at 
all.  Id. at 60,467. 
 82. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
“neither the FDA policy statement regarding the use of the term ‘natural,’” nor a letter from the 
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that applies to cosmetics.83  Though the FDA considered mandating a formal 
definition for natural in 1991,84 no definition has been issued to date.85  The FDA 
justifies the lack of a formal definition by citing the difficulty of defining the 
term, given that most food has been processed in some way.86  The FDA’s 
informal definition continues to be a part of the legal lexicon of “natural”—a 
word that carries market value—and is, therefore, the focus of litigation, 
particularly between competitors.  Recent cases pertain to products containing 
high fructose corn syrup, genetically modified organisms, artificial 
preservatives, and those processed with chemicals or containing other unnatural 
ingredients.87  Another recent case questioned whether the use of common 
vitamin names was misleading when the vitamins included synthetic ingredients 
and the product was labeled “all natural.”88 
In other cases involving non-food products, the courts have refused to make a 
determination about whether an “all natural” label was false.89  Some courts are 
forced to create their own definition of “natural” because of the FDA’s failure 
to promulgate a definition;90 when courts have asked the FDA to weigh in on the 
                                                 
FDA classifying the contested product as natural, were operable because they lacked the “force of 
law”). 
 83. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting 
the lack of either a formal or informal definition of “natural” in the cosmetics context).  See also 
Paul M. Hyman & Samina N. Rodriguez, Regulation of Labeling and Advertising Claims, in 
COSMETIC REGULATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 43, 46–47 (Norman F. Estrin & James 
M. Akerson eds., 2000) (“There is no definition in . . . FDA regulations of the term natural as used 
to describe a cosmetic product or ingredient.”). 
 84. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of 
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,466. 
 85. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of 
Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of 
Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 (Jan. 6, 1993) (“Because of resource limitations and other agency 
priorities, [the] FDA is not undertaking rulemaking to establish a definition for ‘natural’ at this 
time.”). 
 86. What is the Meaning of ‘Natural’ on the Label of Food, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214868.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2012) 
[hereinafter What is the Meaning of Natural?] (noting that the FDA does not object when “natural” 
is used to classify products that are free of “added color, artificial flavors, or synthetic substances”). 
 87. See Dawn Goulet, Confusion in Courts Over “All Natural” Claims, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG.: 
CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS (Apr. 30, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
committees/classactions/articles/spring2012-0412-all-natural-labels-mean-marketing.html 
(discussing emerging lawsuits concerning the definition of “natural”). 
 88. See Hairston v. South Beach Beverage Co., No. CV 12-1429-JFW (DTBx), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 74279, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2012). 
 89. See, e.g., Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(refusing to determine whether a natural label on cosmetics was false or misleading without FDA 
guidance). 
 90. See, e.g., Janney v. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d 806, 813 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (stating that waiting 
for the FDA to develop its own definition would be “futile”). 
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meaning of “natural,” the agency has declined to do so.91  Notably, in 2008, the 
FDA announced it would leave “natural” undefined, despite continued confusion 
over the definition.92 
As a result, class actions continue to center on the proper use of the word 
natural in food and cosmetics advertising.93  Yet, such actions have failed to gain 
much traction in the courts.  Stymied by the lack of a definition, cases thus far 
are stayed pending FDA input,94 languish waiting for a ruling on motions and/or 
procedural matters,95 or are resolved through either a voluntary dismissal by the 
plaintiffs96 or a settlement agreement.97  There is an additional challenge for 
certain avenues of products liability litigation because products labeled “all 
natural” may not be deemed defective if a synthetic element is included; the 
inclusion is intentional.98  Similarly, labels defining a product as “all natural” 
                                                 
 91. See Order Lifting Stay at 1, 3, Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., 2010 WL 2539386 (D.N.J. 
June 15, 2010) (No. 08-2797 (JBS)), 2010 WL 2539386, at *1 [hereinafter Order Lifting Stay] 
(incorporating into a court order a letter from the FDA refusing Judge Jerome Simandle’s request 
to define the word “natural”).  Although government agencies have not formally defined “natural,” 
they define phrases that include the term “natural.”  For example, the FDA has a definition for 
“natural flavor.”  See 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(3) (2011). 
 92. See April Lynn Farris, The “Natural” Aversion: The FDA’s Reluctance to Define a 
Leading Food-Industry Marketing Claim, and the Pressing Need for a Workable Rule, 65 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 403, 407 (2010). Some manufacturers seem less inclined to seek formal definitions.  
Quaker Oats recently argued that “wholesome” was a term of “puffery,” and thus, presumably, 
without meaning about the healthfulness of its products.  Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. 
Supp. 2d 1111, 1125–26 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 93. See, e.g., Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
a claim predicated on defendant’s use of the word “natural” was not preempted because “there is 
no FDA policy with which state law could conflict”); Briseno v. Con Agra Foods, Inc., No. CV 11-
05379 MMM (AGRx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154750, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (claiming 
that Con Agra’s use of “100% natural” on its labels was misleading because of its use of genetically 
modified seeds); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Nos. C 10-4387 PJH, C 10-4937 PJH, 
2011 WL 2111796, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (challenging Ben & Jerry’s and Breyer’s use 
of the term “natural” for ice cream containing alkalized cocoa); Coyle, 2010 WL 2539386, at *1 
(challenging Hornell’s use of a “100% NATURAL” label when the drink contained high fructose 
corn syrup); Lockwood v. Con Agra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(challenging the use of “all natural” on labels for pasta sauce that contains high fructose corn syrup).  
See also Ashley, supra note 77, at 266 (predicting that public interest in “natural” claims will 
continue until a better definition of what is “natural” is formulated). 
 94. See, e.g., Coyle, 2010 WL 2539386, at *5 (staying the case pending an FDA response to 
Judge Jerome Simandle’s request for advice on the meaning of “natural”). 
 95. See, e.g., Astiana, 2011 WL 2111796, at *2 (outlining the lengthy procedural history of 
one class action). 
 96. See Goulet, supra note 87 (noting that in one case, after the FDA declined to define 
“natural,” the plaintiffs dismissed the case). 
 97. See id. (describing one settlement that required defendants to establish $7.5 million in 
restitution funds, and cease labeling their products “all natural”). 
 98. See Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. C 11-5188 SI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162402, at *8–
9 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (finding that the products at issue were not “defective” because the 
incorporated synthetic ingredients were “knowingly and purposefully added or used”).  Other cases 
use “natural” to describe what one would expect certain foods to contain.  These ingredients may 
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may not create a warranty under certain products liability statutes.99  Yet, despite 
these issues, there is a vibrant string of pending and newly decided cases 
challenging natural labels on products containing GMOs, preservatives, and 
high fructose corn syrup.100  The continued filing of these types of cases 
emphasizes both the market importance of the term “natural” and the need for 
clarity in regulations. 
C.  The Department of Agriculture’s Regulation of Natural Goods 
In comparison to the FDA, the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) addressed the lack of a definition for “natural” more directly, adopting 
a definition of the word in its Food Standards and Labeling Policy Book.101  In 
2005, the USDA, through informal policy, defined “natural” as not containing 
artificial ingredients or flavors and minimally processed.102  The policy lists 
specifically acceptable processes, like roasting, drying, and fermenting.103  
Products that undergo chemical bleaching or fundamental changes to the raw 
product, are not considered natural.104  In addition, the USDA requires that all 
products purporting to be natural include a brief statement explaining the term 
“natural.”105  The policy does not rise to the level of formal rulemaking, but it 
does provide a more concrete understanding of the term.  The definition is 
limited in application, however, because it applies only to meat and poultry 
products.106 
                                                 
include molds and assorted other bacteria.  See, e.g., Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 
1292, 1301–02 (Cal. 1992) (explaining that if a “substance is natural to the preparation of the food 
served, it can be said that it was reasonably expected by its very nature and the food cannot be 
determined to be unfit for human consumption or defective”). 
 99. See Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing a 
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim after finding that labels on food are merely product 
descriptions and do not promise defect-free products); Littlehale v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., No. 
C 11-6342 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162530, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2012) (stating that “pure 
natural” and “all natural” are product descriptions, not warranties as defined by the MMWA). 
 100. See Nicole E. Negowetti, A National ‘Natural” Standard for Food Labeling, 65 ME. L. 
REV. 581, 596–99 (2013) (listing many products that are the subject of litigation, and noting that 
Pepperidge Farms, Inc.’s Cheddar Goldfish crackers are among the contested foods). 
 101. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK 116 (2005), 
[hereinafter FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK] available at http://www.fsis.us 
da.gov/OPPDE/larc/Policies/Labeling_Policy_Book_082005.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 116–17 (explaining that a natural label may be used if the product lacks artificial 
color or flavoring, chemical preservatives, or other synthetic ingredients; in order to remain natural, 
a raw product must be only minimally altered). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Product Labeling: Definition of the Term “Natural,” 71 Fed. Reg. 70,503, 70,504 (Dec. 
5, 2006). 
 106. Id. at 70,503–04. 
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The USDA’s informal definition of what is natural parallels the agency’s 
definition of “organic” in National Organic Program (NOP) regulations.107  Via 
the NOP, the USDA has provided a list of “nonsynthetic” ingredients that are 
allowed in organic products as well as a list of “nonsynthetic” ingredients that 
are impermissible.108  The NOP’s regulations consider “nonsynthetic” and 
“natural” synonymous, and define a “nonsynthetic” substance as one that “is 
derived from mineral, plant, or animal matter and does not undergo a synthetic 
process . . . .”109  In contrast, a “synthetic” substance is defined as one “that is 
formulated or manufactured by a chemical process or by a process that 
chemically changes a substance extracted from naturally occurring plant, 
animal, or mineral sources . . . .”110 
D.  The Federal Trade Commission’s Attempts to Define “Natural” 
In 1974, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed a rule defining 
“natural” foods as those with no artificial or synthetic ingredients, and only 
minimal processing.111  However, in 1983, the FTC terminated its rulemaking, 
concluding that it could not define “natural” because the word has different 
meanings in different contexts, and that agency resources should be used for 
more pressing matters.112  The FTC still declines to define “natural” in a 
comprehensive way.113 
Regardless, the FTC has distinguished natural products in specific 
circumstances.  For example, the FTC distinguishes a “natural fiber” from a 
“manufactured fiber,” defining a “natural fiber” as one “that exists as such in the 
natural state,” and a “manufactured fiber” as one “derived by a process of 
manufacture from any substance which, at any point in the manufacturing 
                                                 
 107. Compare FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK, supra note 101, at 116–17 
(defining “natural” as a product lacking synthetic ingredients or preservatives), with 7 C.F.R. § 
205.300(a) (2013) (stating that the word “‘organic’ may only be used on labels and in the labeling 
of raw or processed agricultural products . . . .”). 
 108. 7 C.F.R. § 205.601–205.602. 
 109. Id. § 205.2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Food Advertising, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842, 39,849 (Nov. 11, 1974) (explaining that the 
impetus for the rule was the government’s concern that consumers would not understand the 
meaning of words like “natural” or “organic” in product advertising, and that “establishment of 
uniform definitions for the use of the terms ‘natural’ (or ‘naturally grown’) or ‘organic’ (or 
‘organically grown’)” could remedy the issue). 
 112. Termination of Proposed Trade Regulation: Rule of Food Advertising, 48 Fed. Reg. 
23,270, 23,270 (May 24, 1983). Similarly, in 1985, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
withdrew its proposed rule, citing difficulty in defining “natural.”  Use of “Natural” in the Labeling 
and Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages, 50 Fed. Reg. 960, 960 (Jan. 8, 1985). 
 113. Karen A. Butcher et al., FTC Releases Final “Green Guides” for Environmental 
Marketing Claims, MORGAN LEWIS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/ 
ACPP_LF_FinalGreenGuidesForEnviroMarketingClaims_3oct12 (noting that “the FTC has 
continued to avoid defining or qualifying the use of some more contentious terms, including 
‘natural,’ ‘organic,’ [and] ‘sustainable’ . . . .”). 
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process, is not a fiber.”114  Similarly, the FTC distinguishes “artificial 
gemstones” from “natural gemstones” in its Consumer Information 
publications.115  It explains that “natural gemstones” are found in nature and are 
more expensive, whereas “laboratory-created gemstones,” despite having the 
same physical characteristics of gemstones, are manufactured, more common, 
and less expensive.116  Additionally, the use of the term “natural” to describe a 
gemstone or similar jewelry product is considered an “unfair or deceptive” 
practice.117 
E.  The Tax Code and Other Consumer Product Definitions 
Other agencies and entities have similarly followed the FDA’s 
synthetic/natural approach when dealing with consumer products.  The Federal 
Tax Code defines “natural” in certain cases in order to determine applicable 
excise taxes for food products.  For example, under 26 U.S.C. § 5381 (2012), a 
“natural wine” is any “product of the juice, ripe grapes or other sound, ripe fruit 
. . . .”118  This statute also outlines approved processes for winemaking, but 
anything beyond minimal and commercially acceptable cellaring and 
manufacturing procedures does not create “natural wine.”119 
In 2004, the U.S. Court of International Trade, in addressing a tariff 
classification, recognized that the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States does not define “natural.”120  However, its predecessor, the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States, defined “natural substances” as “those 
substances found . . . in their molecular structure as found in nature.”121  Notably, 
this definition focuses on whether changes have been made to the product 
through human action. 
F.  Environmental Statutes and Definitions of “Natura” 
Questions about what is natural arise both directly and indirectly in 
environmental legislation.  While statutes define natural resources, these are less 
likely to be the subject of dispute, and therefore provide fewer insights into the 
meaning of “nature.”  This section discusses the National Park Overflights Act, 
                                                 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 70(c)–(d) (2012).  Other FTC definitions likewise require little alteration in 
order for a substance to be classified as natural.  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 250.2(c) (1999)   (noting that 
“[w]ood names or names suggesting wood should not be used to refer to materials which, while 
produced from wood particles or fibers, do not possess a natural wood growth structure”). 
 115. See Gemstones, Diamonds, & Pearls, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.consumer. 
ftc.gov/articles/0295-gemstones-diamonds-pearls (last updated July 2012). 
 116. Id. 
 117. 16 C.F.R. § 23.24 (2012). 
 118. 26 U.S.C. § 5381 (2012). 
 119. Id. at § 5382. 
 120. Vanetta U.S.A. Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004). 
 121. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED, 
1987 4–73 (1986). 
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Endangered Species Act, and Wilderness Act because they offer strong 
examples of how environmental legislation has codified the relationship 
between man and nature. 
1.  The National Park Overflights Act 
In August of 1987, Congress passed the National Park Overflights Act,122 
which recognized that aircraft flying over the Grand Canyon National Park were 
negatively impacting the “natural quiet and experience of the park . . . .”123  In 
response, Congress gave the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the power 
to regulate the airspace.124 
Following the passage of the Act, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FAA 
had to adopt the National Park Service (NPS)’s definition of “substantial 
restoration of the natural quiet,” which requires that “[fifty percent] or more of 
the park achieve ‘natural quiet’ (i.e., no aircraft audible) for 75–100 percent of 
the day.”125  The Court also recognized that the agency could adopt the three-
decibels-above-ambient measure of audibility used by the NPS.126  Ultimately, 
the D.C. Circuit found that the FAA’s Final Rule meant that “an aircraft breaks 
the natural silence only when it is three decibels louder than the ambient sound—
whether that sound is the roar of the river or the song of the birds.”127  After the 
D.C. Circuit ruling, the FAA changed its interpretation concerning the measure 
of audibility such that it maintained the three-decibels-above-ambient standard 
for populated areas of the park, but substituted an eight-decibels-below-ambient 
standard in backcountry areas of the park.128 
The FAA’s adoption of this standard was challenged in United States Air Tour 
Ass’n v. FAA.129  The Air Tour Association argued that the new standard altered 
                                                 
 122. See Pub. L. No. 100-91, § 3(a), 101 Stat. 674, 676 (1987) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a–1 
(2012)). 
 123. Id.  The Act intends to preserve the “natural quiet” of national parks by creating “flight 
free zones.”  Id.  The Grand Canyon National Park received special overflight rules, which were 
finalized December 31, 1996; those new rules created flight free zones encompassing 
approximately eighty percent of the Grand Canyon National Park.  Jennifer C. Chen, Special Flight 
Rules in the Vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park: A Deafening debate Over Restoring Natural 
Quiet, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 877, 877, 883 (1997). 
 124. § 1(e), 101 Stat. at 675. 
 125. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 126. Id. at 461, 465. 
 127. Id. at 465. 
 128. See U.S. Air Tour Ass’n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  Legislation raged 
over the NPS and FAA’s interpretation of “natural quiet” and focused on whether the standard 
should be one of noticeability (how loud or distracting the sound is to humans) or audibility 
(whether humans can hear the sound).  See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 461.  See 
also Daniel W. Anderson, In Pursuit of “Natural Quiet”: The Latest on Noise for Airports and 
Airlines, AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2004, at 10 (describing the limitations of the FAA’s Integrated 
Noise Model, which focuses on the  noticeability of aircraft sound (noisiness) rather than 
audibility). 
 129. See U.S. Air Tour Ass’n, 298 F.3d at 1001. 
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what constituted “natural quiet” because the FAA’s previous interpretation was 
based on “noticeability,” whereas the new interpretation was based on 
“detectability.”130  The D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding that the FAA’s 
explanation of the new standard was reasonable.131 
2.  The Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act incorporates human intervention in an unusual 
way.  Under the Act, animals that have been geographically moved by humans 
are ineligible for full protection.132  This is true even if the same species of 
animal is protected in its original location.133  These “natural” populations 
receive the full safeguards of the Act, while the relocated “experimental” 
populations may not.134  A single instance of human interaction or relocation, 
therefore, can permanently disqualify an otherwise protected wildlife group. 
3.  The Wilderness Act 
Conservation and preservation laws have advanced on the basis of the idea 
that in order to protect vast areas of natural resources, animal habitats, or unique 
landscapes, these areas must be inaccessible to humans, lest human presence 
inevitably change and destroy them.135  This is the premise of the Wilderness 
Act of 1964, which preserves nature in areas “where the earth and its community 
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain.”136 
The NPS was founded upon the idea that nature consists of undisturbed areas 
uninhabited by humanity.137  The Wilderness Act distinguishes wilderness from 
areas in which humans and man-made structures dominate.138  Additionally, the 
Act defines wilderness as “undeveloped” and “retaining its primeval character 
                                                 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C) (2012). 
 133. See id. at § 1539(j)(1) –(2). 
 134. See id. at § 1539(j).  Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the 
Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1378–79 (2002) (suggesting that such “absurd results 
might occur when reality confronts the legal fiction that reintroduced populations are distinct from 
naturally occurring populations”). 
 135. BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 8 (1989) (arguing that if current conditions 
proceed unchecked, changes to nature caused by humans “will clash with our perceptions, until, 
finally, our sense of nature as eternal and separate is washed away, and we will see all too clearly 
what we have done”). 
 136. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a), (c); see Klein, supra note 134, at 1374 (“The Wilderness Act of 1964 
is perhaps the best legislative manifestation of the impulse to divide the world into the mutually 
exclusive spheres of nature and culture.”) 
 137. Federico Cheever, British National Parks for North Americans: What We Can Learn 
From a More Crowded Nation Proud of its Countryside, 26 STAN. EVTL. L.J. 247, 304 (2007). 
 138. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 
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and influence[] without permanent improvements or human habitation . . . .”139  
The definition also includes areas that have developed naturally, “with the 
imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable . . . .”140  The Act mandates 
that such wilderness areas be protected to maintain their “natural conditions.”141  
This definition of “wilderness” implements the human/nature binary.142  As 
David Delaney observed, the idea of what constitutes “wilderness” is a perfect 
example “of the social construction of nature.”143 
Additionally, the Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct studies 
and surveys of possible wilderness sites.144  To identify such sites, the Act directs 
the Secretary to look for every roadless area of 5,000 contiguous acres or more 
and determine whether that area should be preserved.145  Roads, therefore, 
became the proxy for human intervention and development.146 
The history of our national park system underlines the cultural history of 
viewing pristine wilderness as uninhabited by humans.147  Mark Spence claims 
                                                 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See generally WILLIAM CRONON, UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN 
PLACE IN NATURE (1995) (criticizing the environmentalism movement for failing to recognize that 
humans are inextricably tied to nature, and suggesting that environmentalists must attempt to 
understand that relationship in order to preserve nature); RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS 
AND THE AMERICAN MIND (4th ed. 2001) (addressing how changes in Americans’ behavior may 
impact the future of wilderness).  The focus of this part of the Article is limited to the legal definition 
of “wilderness” and its reliance on a human/nature binary. 
 143. David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of (Cultural) Production, 
91 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 487, 492 (2001).  Delany describes “wilderness” as a 
“highly politicized concept,” attributing “[t]he overt politicization of ‘wilderness’” to “the 
irreducible ambiguity, if not indeterminacy, of the term.”  Id.  The term “nature” may face a similar 
fate if it continues to go undefined.  Failing to face the ambiguity of the term could lead to increased 
politicization and manipulation by legislators without consumer and citizen input.  There would be 
an unfortunate irony in defining “nature” without citizen participation.  Creating a national identity 
is tied to defining the national landscape and the cultural meaning of nature.  See KENNETH ROBERT 
OLWIG, LANDSCAPE, NATURE AND THE BODY: POLITIC: FROM BRITAIN’S RENAISSANCE TO 
AMERICA’S NEW WORLD xxiii (2002) (describing the “interlinked meanings of landscape and 
nature, and the ways they have variously been used to define the body politic”). 
 144. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).  See also ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
WILDERNESS LAWS: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES 6 (2011) 
(describing the Wilderness Act and similar statutes that “direct[] the agencies to review the 
wilderness potential of certain lands”). 
 145. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c). 
 146. See Klein, supra note 134, at 1374 (describing the absurd results of such arbitrary 
formalism, including local officials racing to construct “roads to nowhere” in order to disqualify 
vast state lands from being eligible for protection under the Wilderness Act). 
 147. See Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 303 (“[T]he ‘preservation’ of so-called wilderness 
areas was really a production of wilderness, in so far as it often involved the forcible expulsion of 
indigenous peoples.”).  See also Lee Schweninger, Writing Nature: Silko and Native Americans as 
Nature Writers, 18 MELUS 47, 48 (1993) (quoting one Native American as claiming that “‘[o]nly 
to the white man was nature a wilderness’”). 
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that the national parks were created by removing Native American tribes who 
lived on the land.148  According to Spence, the idea of wilderness shifted over 
time, with Americans initially equating wilderness with its Native American 
inhabitants, but eventually determining that reservations were the appropriate 
home for Native Americans.149 Ultimately, Spence argues, Americans wanted 
“the uninhabited wilderness preserved in national parks as remnants of a priori 
Nature (with a very capital N).”150 
The Act’s definition of “wilderness” and its use of roadless areas as a proxy 
strongly delineates what is human from what is natural.  This human/nature 
binary is arguably so much the heart of our wilderness preservation system that 
it “bears only passing relation to biodiversity and habitat protection.”151 
Finally, though there is growing academic support to reconceptualize the idea 
of wilderness,152 the man/nature dichotomy is deeply enshrined in the American 
concept of wilderness, and it is considered one of the nation’s most strongly held 
beliefs.153 
4.  The Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act of 1972 defines pollution as any “man-made or man-
induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological 
integrity of water.”154  The Act’s legislative history defines “nature” as “that 
condition in existence before the activities of man invoked perturbations that 
prevented the system from returning to its original state of equilibrium.”155  This 
definition separates elements based on whether they were created by man or 
nature, and presumes that the former harms the latter when the two interact.  As 
a result, the Act failed to address any non-human sources of contamination (such 
as contamination resulting from other animals, microbes, etc.).  The Clean Water 
Acts presents another clear demarcation between humanity and nature, as the 
Act’s purpose could justify the inclusion of both naturally occurring and man-
made pollutants. 
                                                 
 148. MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE 
MAKING OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 3–4 (1999). 
 149. Id. at 4.  Spence explains that “[a]ntebellum Americans did not conceive of wilderness 
and Indians as separate.”  Id. at 10. 
 150. Id. at 5. 
 151. Jamison E. Colburn, Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 145, 175 (2007). 
 152. See Michael P. Nelson & J. Baird Callicott, Introduction, in THE WILDERNESS DEBATE 
RAGES ON 1, 13 (Michael P. Nelson & J. Baird Callicott eds., 2008). 
 153. WILLIAM CRONON, THE TROUBLE WITH NATURE 24 (1995).  See also Peter A. Appel, 
Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 66 (2010) (describing Americans’ attachment 
to the idea of wilderness and its protection); NASH, supra note 142, at xi (claiming that 
“[w]ilderness was the basic ingredient of American culture”). 
 154. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2012). 
 155. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972). 
938 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:917 
G.  Do Contradictions Matter When Patents and Wines Rarely Meet? 
Given that some regulations of different agencies rarely interact, it is 
reasonable to question whether there is a significant problem in having disparate, 
if not contradictory, definitions.  The continuing efforts to reconcile definitions, 
at least in consumer products shows that there must be some drawback to 
multiple definitions.  Thus, the Better Business Bureau (BBB), in cooperation 
with advertising associations, established the Advertising Self-Regulating 
Council, to minimize government involvement in advertisements, settle 
competitor disputes fairly, and increase public trust in the veracity of 
advertisements.156  Additionally, in 1990, the Nutrition Labeling Education Act 
(NLEA) amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to preempt existing state 
laws regulating nutritional labeling in an attempt to unify the various 
standards.157  First, given that labeling something as natural is a marketable 
product description heavily relied upon by consumers, there are legitimate 
reasons to seek a uniform decision that meets consumer expectations.  Both 
NLEA and BBB efforts seem to indicate recognition this need. 
Second, businesses may benefit from a coordination of definitions, even if 
only some of those definitions are immediately relevant to consumer decision-
making.  Many businesses deal with more than one agency’s definitions on a 
regular basis.  Indeed, the same product, perhaps a wine both sold in the U.S. 
and marketed abroad, would potentially be subject to USDA, ATF, FTC, and 
Internal Revenue Code definitions.  Navigating conflicting regulations almost 
certainly raises the cost of doing business and creates legal uncertainties with 
respect to compliance.158  Coordination among agencies would reduce both 
challenges for businesses. 
There may be reasons for and against including the USPTO definition within 
the coordination project.  The patent process is, arguably, sufficiently distinct so 
as to minimize issues of coordinating compliance among multiple agencies.  At 
the same time, as the Myriad Genetics case indicates, when it comes to the 
natural exception to patentability, the USPTO and the courts remain 
substantially confused about how to articulate a definition of “natural” that will 
yield predictable outcomes for patentees.159  Thus, there could be benefits to the 
USPTO engaging in formal rulemaking on the definition. 
Finally, whether or not contradictions remain among agency definitions, 
continuing litigation over the meaning of “natural” and the use of the term as a 
product selling point indicates a substantial need for formal definitions that will 
                                                 
 156. See National Advertising Review Services, COUNCIL BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, 
http://www.bbb.org/council/the-national-partner-program/national-advertising-review-services/ 
(lasted visited May 30, 2014) (explaining the BBB’s promotion of self-regulation and industry-
wide standards). 
 157. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012). 
 158. See Shaw, supra note 12. 
 159. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (describing the uncertainty the Myriad 
Genetics decision caused). 
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be predictable in application.  Such definitions would reduce business costs 
within the natural products sectors. 
II.  CHALLENGES OF DEFINING NATURE BY MAN’S MODIFICATION OR 
INTERVENTION 
A.  Man’s Spectrum of Intent and Predicting Case Outcomes 
There is an inherent difficulty in seeking a binary answer (natural or not) when 
the question is answered by investigating a spectrum of human intervention or 
intent.  As discussed above, in fleshing out the natural phenomena exception to 
patentability, courts have focused on the level of human application.  In Funk 
Bros., a new mixture of bacteria was insufficient to obtain a patent as it was too 
close to a discovery.160  The Court has said that it is insufficient for a new product 
or process to “have been the product of skill,” rather, it must be a “product of 
invention,”161 and an application must be “more than a drafting effort designed 
to monopolize the law of nature itself.”162  Although unclear after Myriad 
Genetics, purification of a naturally occurring substance appears to be sufficient 
for patentability.163  Yet courts have failed to clearly articulate what level of 
creation/application is necessary. 
Similarly, the FDA and USDA ideas of nature require immediate recourse to 
a scale of human intervention, asking how much is too much for a product to 
remain natural. When the FDA informally defined natural products as those in 
which “nothing artificial or synthetic” is added, the spectrum of human action 
immediately came into play, particularly because the FDA did not elaborate on 
the definitions of “artificial” or “synthetic.”164  The FDA’s prior treatment of 
flavorings suggests the natural label is acceptable if something is derived from 
a plant or animal source only, even when the substance has been “isolated, 
concentrated, or extracted by a process such as distillation or the use of solvents 
. . . .”165  Manufacturers have been left to wonder how much human intervention 
is too much.  Disputes have centered on actions such as alkalization, 
bioengineering, and the use of high fructose corn syrup.166  The USDA’s 
definition created a similar scale by introducing the idea of “minimally 
processed” foods, which raised a question of how much human intervention is 
                                                 
 160. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 161. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–32 (1948). 
 162. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012). 
 163. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Watson, 135 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1955) (explaining 
that the natural version of the substance at issue had no therapeutic value, while the purified form 
did, and that, therefore, the purified form was patentable). 
 164. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of 
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991). 
 165. Hyman & Rodriguez, supra note 83, at 46–47. 
 166. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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considered “minimal.”167  The policy lists specifically acceptable processes, but 
it is more difficult to determine which processes are not acceptable, such as 
alkalization.168 
In general, the lack of formal and coherent definitions of the term “natural” 
has increased litigation risks and costs with little apparent benefit from resisting 
the process of formal rulemaking. 
B.  Finding Ground Zero: What is Intervention/Modification/Application 
Free? 
One of the oddities—or, perhaps, culturally uncomfortable features—of the 
idea of nature as something pristine without any human intervention is that such 
pristine things may be rare, or even non-existent.  Even if there were a scale of 
increasing manipulation to replace the current definition of natural, those things 
at the lowest level of intervention still would be suspect because it is difficult 
for something to be fully free of human impacts. 
We live in a deeply changed landscape.169  It is challenging to postulate a 
potential starting point for intensive human changes of the landscape.  In rural 
England, for example, there were enormous agrarian advancements throughout 
history, but historians debate whether these changes occurred during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or as early as the sixteenth century.170  
Whatever the specifics of timing, England’s arable real property was largely 
reclaimed from lands as diverse as marshes, heaths, and coastal mudflats.171  
Scholars believe both rural England and northern Europe underwent significant 
landscape changes due to “deforestation, drainage, and general settlement.”172  
England’s rulers granted lands to people on the condition that they reclaim the 
land for agricultural use through drainage and irrigation.173  Thus, the ideal 
                                                 
 167. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 169. See generally IAN G. SIMMONS, CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH: CULTURE, 
ENVIRONMENT, HISTORY 2 (2d ed. 1996) (describing “the changes humans have wrought in their 
surroundings”). 
 170. See TOM WILLIAMSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL ENGLAND: FARMING AND 
THE LANDSCAPE 1700–1870, 1, 3 (2002). 
 171. C.S. & C.S. ORWIN, THE OPEN FIELDS 15–17 (2d ed. 1954). 
 172. Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, Rival Ecologies of Global Commerce, 115 AM. HIST. REV. 
1342, 1348 (2010). 
 173. See Viola Florence Barnes, Land Tenure in English Colonial Charters of the Seventeenth 
Century, in ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHARLES MCLEAN ANDREWS 4, 11 
(1931). 
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plantation lord-husbandman174 was capable of effectively clearing swamp area 
for farming.175 
The English exported this system to Ireland during colonization, encouraging 
landscape-changing techniques to build the base of arable lands.176  American 
colonies were evaluated for settlement in terms of how useful the land was for 
agriculture after swamp draining.177  Such lands were prized because, once 
drained, the swamps or bogs would become “the best lands in the province.”178  
Beyond reclamation, husbandry practices generally transformed lands through 
the introduction of non-native plant and animal species.179  For example, 
colonists found that the European cattle they brought to the colonies quickly 
depleted native grasses, and landscapes were, in turn, transformed.180 
During the twentieth century, this pattern of intensive intervention continued, 
creating new landscapes ideal for economic development.  Humans built in high-
risk areas and forced the landscape to fit their demands.  Major cities and 
agricultural areas developed in arid climates, draining fresh water resources and 
challenging ecosystems.  For example, cities including Los Angeles, San Diego, 
and Phoenix have diverted water from the Colorado River for irrigation 
purposes, causing it to fall 130 feet since 2000.181  Similarly, the Aral Sea was 
drained of ninety percent of its fresh water though agricultural irrigation, which 
created a desert and devastated the local ecosystem.182 
                                                 
 174. Notably, it was not only enterprising plantation owners and lords who impacted the 
landscape through concentrated reclamations of lands.  Monastic groups also concentrated their 
labors by entering “into waste places” where they “cut down the forests, drained the swamps, built 
dwellings, and cultivated the soil.”  ARTHUR LYNN CROSS, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND 
GREATER BRITAIN 37 (1919). 
 175. ALEXANDER HEWAT, AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE 
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suggesting that westward progress was preferable.  See GEORGE LLOYD JOHNSON, JR., THE 
FRONTIER IN THE COLONIAL SOUTH, SOUTH CAROLINA BACKCOUNTRY 1736–1800 25 (1997). 
 179. See Jonsson, supra note 172, at 1343–44. 
 180. Id. at 1343. 
 181. See Sarah Zielinski, The Colorado River Runs Dry, SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-colorado-river-runs-dry-61427169/?no-ist 
(explaining that seventy percent of the water in the river is diverted elsewhere for crop irrigation). 
 182. See Pat Walters, Aral Sea Recovery?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 2, 2010), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/04/100402-aral-sea-story/.  See also Aral Sea ‘One 
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Other communities forced rivers underground and built cities above them.183  
Additionally, approximately three billion people throughout the world live in 
cities built on the coast where they are susceptible to the dangers of rising sea 
levels as a result of global warming.184  A recent study suggests 1,400 U.S. cities 
are threatened by rising sea levels, and 316 cities are likely to be partially 
submerged by the end of the century.185 
Landscape changes are also inextricably connected to climate change, which 
has been recognized for over 250 years.186  For example, irrigation and swamp 
drainage are thought to contribute to local climate change.187  Similarly, 
deforestation modifies the water cycle and potentially increases precipitation 
levels.188  An example of climate change is the Dust Bowl of the Great Plains, 
                                                 
of the Planet’s Worst Environmental Disasters’, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 5, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/7554679/Aral-Sea-one-of-the-planets-worst-
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 183. See Brian Clark Howard, 11 Rivers Forced Underground, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
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 184. See Gaia Vince, The Rising and Sinking Threats to Our Cities, BBC (June 13, 2013), 
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suggested a link between deforestation and climate change in the late 1760s). 
 187. See Roger A. Pielke, Sr. et al., The Influence of Anthropogenic Landscape Changes on 
Weather in South Florida, 127 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 1663, 1663, 1669 (1999) (explaining 
how landscape changes in the Florida Everglades are linked to that area’s decrease in rainfall). 
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which was caused by overfarming and overgrazing and resulted in a substantial 
drought that lasted for years.189  In contrast to areas that suffer because of human 
intervention, areas with more intact ecosystems, including reefs and wetlands, 
provide substantial protection to developed lands from coastal threats.190 
With such a substantial history of human impact on the environment, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to identify something that is entirely natural when 
the term is defined as the absence of human intervention.  Is there a baseline left 
against which we truly can contrast our litany of potential humanness through 
the artificial or synthetic?  History and social science scholars tend to answer 
that question in the negative.  As Steve Hinchliffe summarizes the problem: 
“what might appear to western eyes as natural objects, as natura naturata, turn 
out to be tangled up with humans . . . .”191 
III.  PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 
Traditionally, the anthropomorphic viewpoint placed man and nature on 
opposite ends of a spectrum; they were viewed as definitional opposites and 
clearly exclusive of each other.192  As Karl Marx succinctly summarized, “Man 
opposes himself to Nature.”193  Kate Soper explains that Western culture views 
nature as dichotomous “between what is naturally given and what is contrived 
(the artificial) and that between what is dictated by nature and what is humanly 
instigated (the cultural or conventional).”194  Both of these definitions “presume 
                                                 
 189. See Great Depression and World War II, 1929–1945, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline
/depwwii/dustbowl/ (last visited May 31, 2014) (describing how overgrazing dried out soil that 
would blow away in the wind). 
 190. See Brian Handwerk, New Map Shows Where Nature Protects U.S. Coast, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (July 14, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/130714-
coastline-beach-coastal-disaster-flood-sea-level-rise-ocean-storm/. 
 191. STEVE HINCHLIFFE, GEOGRAPHIES OF NATURE: SOCIETIES, ENVIRONMENTS, 
ECOLOGIES 14 (2007).  In fact, Hinchliffe claims that “natural processes are now so polluted and 
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 192. See Colburn, supra note 151, at 149 (noting that both “‘nature’ and ‘state of nature’ have 
been put opposite human culture . . . for the whole history of the liberal state”). 
 193. See Margaret Fitzsimmons, The Matter of Nature, 21 ANTIPODE 106, 114 (1989). 
 194. KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE?: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE NON-HUMAN 37 (1995).  
This is not, of course, to say that Western culture has created a single cultural concept of nature.  
Undoubtedly, there are numerous regional variations, and arguably, similar binaries exist even 
within those variations.  Our tendency “[i]n our everyday language” is to “treat nature and society 
as separate entities[,]” and therefore “if something is social, then almost by definition it can’t be 
natural.”  HINCHLIFFE, supra note 191, at 10 (2007).  The strongest weight of voices supports this 
trend, and as this Article demonstrates, the belief is visible within the American legal regime. 
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that there are certain ways in which humanity can—and indeed must—be 
counterposed to the rest of nature.”195 
Previously, there were many justifications for the traditional viewpoint.  
Mankind possessed the agency, culture, intellectual pursuits, and self-awareness 
that elevated it above other animals.  This differentiation also played an 
important role in racial relations, gender inequality, and other social 
stratifications; anything seen as different or uncivilized was considered 
nonhuman.196  Additionally, humans contain souls and a conscious intellect, 
something no plant, animal, or other living organism could claim.197  Human 
physical and intellectual domination paved the way for a narrow 
conceptualization of nature as outside and opposed to that which is human. 
Early ecological theory scientifically justified the idea that any human 
intervention would negatively impact nature.  Frederic Clements provided the 
popular end-state theory, arguing that all the competition and successions of 
species would lead to a final “climax” landscape that would be the most natural 
equilibrium.198  This “highest and best use” approach excluded human 
                                                 
 195. SOPER, supra note 194, at 37. 
 196. See David Delaney, Semantic Ecology and Lexical Violence: Nature as the Limits of the 
Law, 5 L. TEXT CULTURE 77, 85–86 (noting that “[n]ature is, above all, a trope for differentiation”).  
A growing body of literature examines the impact of the idea of traditional gender roles on the 
human/nature binary.  If traditional ecology and historical religious views considered man separate 
from nature because of man’s intelligence, spirituality, and consciousness, then immediate 
implications flow from feminizing “Mother Nature.”  See also DOREEN MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE, 
AND GENDER 10 (1994) (arguing that there is a gender prejudice in our culture of nature with 
“[w]oman stand[ing] as metaphor for Nature (in another characteristic dualism), for what has been 
lost (left behind)”); Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 305 (suggesting that “oppressive gender rules 
are legitimated because they are seen as natural”).  The feminization of nature aligns with another 
traditional and problematic dualism—that of the mind/body split in which women are viewed as 
being more aligned with the body.  See SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, 
WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 5 (2003) (“[W]hatever the specific historical content of the 
duality, the body is the negative term, and if woman is the body, then women are that negativity, 
whatever it may be: distraction from knowledge, seduction away from God, capitulation to sexual 
desire, violence or aggression, failure of will, even death.”).  Older scholarly works examined the 
interplay between nature and ethnicity, critiquing the radicalized notion that some people could be 
“closer to nature,” with those people necessarily being “subjects called woman, indigenous, and so 
on . . . .”  HINCHLIFFE, supra note 191, at 17.  See also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543, 590 (1823), (stating that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, 
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave 
them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness”); Glen Elder et al., Le 
Pratique Sauvage: Race, Place, and the Human-Animal Divide, in ANIMAL GEOGRAPHIES: PLACE, 
POLITICS, AND IDENTITY IN THE NATURE-CULTURE BORDERLANDS 80 (Jennifer Wolch & Jody 
Emel eds., 1998) (arguing that early American stories about animals represented the way certain 
native populations were radicalized and dehumanized). 
 197. See Fitzsimmons, supra note 193, at 107 (arguing that “[t]he perverse view that Nature is 
external and primordial is unconsciously confirmed by our placement as intellectuals in a spatially 
organized society in which ‘intellectual work’ and ‘intellectual life’ are urban”). 
 198. FREDERIC E. CLEMENTS, PLANT SUCCESSION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
VEGETATION 854–55 (1916). 
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involvement; human interference would disturb nature’s course and 
permanently prevent equilibrium.199 
Over the years, ecology adopted other theories, and the importance of the 
climax theory lessened.  The separation of humanity from the natural, however, 
remained.  Not until recently did ecologists postulate any human-inclusive 
ecological theories.  In the last two centuries there have emerged a variety of 
theories of ecology and differing views on the definitions of “nature” and 
“human,” as well as the role of law.200  Conceptualizations of nature within 
ecology change with the passage of time and as the result of our cultural heritage 
and scientific advancements.201  For example, “preservationists” once viewed 
game animals as a crop that needed to be eradicated from their land.202  Thus, 
cultural ideas, particularly views of marketable goods, had a strong influence on 
society’s ideas of conservation and preservation.203 
To understand the influence of ecology on the process of legally defining 
“nature,” it is significant to note the timing of these fluxes.  Until recently, nature 
was viewed as conflicting directly with human progress.204  Humans tend to 
place themselves outside of nature and fail to acknowledge their vital biological 
role in the ecosystem.205 
If nature is pristine and man is inherently outside of nature, then the 
preservation of nature begins with the concept that man’s interaction should be 
prevented because it negates the “natural” aspect of nature.206  Consequently, 
                                                 
 199. See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847 (1994). 
 200. See Jonathan Baert Weiner, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 1, 9 (1996) (discussing the idea of nature as existing in flux rather than in equilibrium); Peter 
Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature 
Philosophers, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 557, 567–71 (1998) (discussing differences between the idea of 
nature at the turn of the century and the concept of nature within the twentieth century). 
 201. See Elder, supra note 196, at 80 (comparing North American and British 
conceptualizations of national parks and wilderness). 
 202. Colburn, supra note 151, at 162.  Ideas of forest conservation were sporadic within the 
United States until well into the twentieth century.  See The Conservation Movement, WISCONSIN 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/turningpoints/tp-033/  (last visited May 
31, 2014). 
 203. Indeed, cultural and spiritual ideas continue to impact modern views of preservation and 
conservation.  See John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955, 
958 (2005) (examining in detail religious literature supporting wilderness preservation).  Nagle 
argues that “[m]uch of the American thinking about wilderness derives from the biblical scriptures 
. . . .”  Id. at 969. 
 204. Colburn, supra note 151, at 149. 
 205. See LIZ WELLS, LAND MATTERS: LANDSCAPE PHOTOGRAPHY, CULTURE AND IDENTITY 
2 (2011).  Wells claims the problem is that “[n]ature is both ‘internal,’ fundamental to what 
constitutes us as human, and ‘out there’ in that we experience the external world through the senses, 
including sight.”  Id. at 5. 
 206. See Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 199, at 870 (arguing that after interaction between 
humans and the natural environment, it is “impossible to return to an ideal state of nature”).  See 
also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 
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legislation historically favors preservationist ideologies, with the primary goal 
of preventing human interaction with previously untouched areas.207 
IV.  HOW THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURE DEFINES MAN AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
A.  Can Consumers Define What Is “Natural”? 
All consumers have some expectation when they see the declaration “all 
natural” on a product’s label.  Their expectations should be considered in the 
context of the spectrum of potential human interventions.  No product arrives at 
a store with zero human intervention.208  Therefore, it is illogical to define 
“nature” as something without human intervention, because it “is an impossible 
standard in so far as all food is [at least] the product of intentional human 
selection.”209  When faced with a spectrum of levels of artificiality or 
manufacture, consumers are unlikely to be sure where to draw the line.  Indeed, 
a binary outcome does not lend itself particularly well to a process spectrum.  
Arguably, most consumers, when given some of the options, see a spectrum and 
are unsure where to draw the line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 338 (1995) (noting that modern environmental law seeks to maintain 
balance between humans and nature, but sometimes human intervention is considered necessary to 
address nature’s own changes (such as naturally originating fires or droughts)).  Modern 
environmental law is evidence of how “representations and images [of nature] that are crafted and 
put into circulation have material consequences . . . .”  Delaney, supra note 143, at 488. 
 207. See Klein, supra note 134, at 1372 (discussing the preservationist ideals underlying the 
creation of the NPS and Wilderness Act of 1963); cf. Colburn, supra note 151, at 149 (claiming 
that modern conservation and preservation theories merged as ecology progressed and the 
population increased).  Critics question whether preservation law has real, tangible benefits or if 
other alternatives will better protect nature.  See, e.g., Appel, supra note 153, at 93 (explaining the 
view that if only “pristine” areas are preserved, other important landscapes will suffer); Alejandro 
E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1405, 1426 (2011) (arguing that preservationist laws are ineffective because they fail to take 
into account the full impact of human/nature interactions in the ecosystem); Klein, supra note 134, 
at 1376 (suggesting that the standards used to determine if an area should be preserved as wilderness 
are arbitrary and could lead to valuable lands being unprotected). 
 208. See What is the Meaning of Natural?, supra note 86. 
 209. Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 3, at 303. 
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A Potential Spectrum of Human Intervention in the Manufacture of a 
Food Substance 
  Minimal   Some      Higher    Maximum 
Harvesting by 
machine 
Purifying Concentrating 
using solvents 
Containing 
genetically 
modified or 
bioengineered 
ingredients 
Transporting, 
freezing, or 
heating 
Alkalizing Using synthetic 
versions of natural 
substances such as 
vitamins 
Irradiating 
Washing with 
water 
Waxing Using additional 
extraction methods 
Containing 
chemicals 
Peeling, 
chopping, 
extracting and 
separating of 
parts by machine 
but without 
chemicals 
Washing 
with a mild 
soap 
Using solvents in 
washing 
Using pesticides 
or insecticides 
Mixing of other 
ingredients 
meeting this 
standard 
Using 
preservatives 
found in 
nature 
Using chemical 
preservatives 
 
B.  Defining Nature in a Climate-Changed World 
The world challenges us daily to redefine our understandings of the 
boundaries between natural and human-caused events.210  Even climate events, 
traditionally considered sudden acts of nature, have been linked to human action.  
For example, in Guatemala, a sinkhole thirty-stories deep was caused by a 
leaking pipe system installed by humans.211  Additionally, a variety of human 
causes, including fracking wastewater disposal, may trigger earthquakes.212  In 
2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake in China was linked to the fluctuating weight 
                                                 
 210. Bill McKibben believes that society has reached the threshold of a new view of man’s 
relationship to what is natural, claiming that we are “at the end of nature.”  MCKIBBEN, supra note 
135, at 8. 
 211. See Ker Than, Guatemala Sinkhole Created by Humans, Not Nature, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
DAILY NEWS (June 3, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/06/100603-science-
guatemala-sinkhole-2010-humans-caused/. 
 212. See Ker Than, Fracking Wastewater Disposal Linked to Remotely Triggered Quakes, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (July 11, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/energy/2013/07/130711-fracking-wastewater-injection-earthquakes/. 
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of water held by China’s Zipingpu Dam.213  Similarly, urbanization significantly 
contributes to flooding, because rain overwhelms urban drainage systems and 
there are no longer enough porous surfaces in hardened land to absorb the excess 
water.214 
Kate Soper defines nature as “those material structures and processes that are 
independent of human activity (in the sense that they are not a humanly created 
product) . . . .”215  Under this definition, an earthquake created by natural gas 
drilling would likely be considered unnatural, but the result is less clear with 
regard to a hurricane that resulted from natural causes and gained strength 
because of a man-made increase in precipitation, or which had a greater impact 
because of the development-fueled loss of wetlands.216 
The traditional human/nature binary, which is haphazardly and partially 
codified into our laws and informal regulations, does not provide an adequate 
basis for dealing with these complicated questions.  Nor does the binary position 
us to accept and respond to the demands of climate change.  Indeed, such cultural 
hang-ups may well explain the continuing presence of those who deny climate 
change. 
V.  FINDING A NEW VOCABULARY FOR NATURE IN PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Consumers are not as well equipped to define “natural” as they assume.217  
This idea suggests that, while their instincts should be taken into account in 
rulemaking definitions, such rulemaking is not effectively replaced by a simple 
                                                 
 213. See Oded Balilty, Photos: How Humans Can Trigger Earthquakes, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(Feb. 10, 2009), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/02/photogalleries/humans-cause-
earthquakes/.  Human-caused global warming causes ice sheets to melt, which can “release pent-
up energy and trigger massive earthquakes.” Mason Inman, Melting Ice Sheets Can Cause 
Earthquakes, Study Finds, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 14, 2008), http://news.national 
geographic.com/news/2008/03/080314-warming-quakes.html. 
 214. See Katie Mika, Costs Of Chronic Urban Flooding Drain Money Out Of Local Economies 
and Governments, THE RIVER BLOG (July 8, 2013), http://www.americanrivers.org/blog/costs-of-
chronic-urban-flooding-drain-money-out-of-local-economies-and-governments-2/ (noting that 
“[u]p to 25% of economic damages caused by flooding occur because runoff overwhelms urban 
drainage systems . . . .”). 
 215. SOPER, supra note 194, at 132. 
 216. Interestingly, the Disaster Relief Act as codified defines a “major disaster” as a “natural 
catastrophe” such as a hurricane, tornado, or earthquake.  42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2012).  See also Jill 
M. Fraley, What We Can Predict and Affect, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/18/natural-disasters-or-acts-of-god/humans-can-predict-and-
affect-what-once-were-acts-of-god (suggesting that the “acts of God” doctrine is on the decline 
because many natural events are now foreseeable). 
 217. Editorial, Is It Really Gluten Free?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A22 (stating “most 
consumers” believe there is no real meaning to the words “lite” and “low carb”).  This makes some 
sense with regard to the term “lite,” but is debatable with regard to “low carb.”  Although the 
average consumer might not know if the descriptor referred to carbohydrates below a specific 
number of grams or compared to the typical product, it would seem that such a specific statement 
would possess some content.  If the New York Times is correct about this (unsupported) statement, 
perhaps consumers are less sure of what “natural” means than we expect them to be. 
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common sense understanding of the word.  Instead, there are substantial benefits 
to a clear definition for consumers, who would be better informed in their 
purchasing decisions, and for businesses, where a coordinated definition would 
prevent unwieldy compliance problems across agencies.  Most importantly, 
rulemaking would offer citizens a voice in the debate before politics and 
corporate litigation relieves them of the opportunity.  If the meaning of nature is 
“multiple, shifting, and unstable,”218 then perhaps it is possible to stabilize a 
definition through formal processes that accommodate citizen voices. 
A.  Defining “Nature” and Property Rights in Patents 
Property rights may provide one lens for focusing efforts to define “natural.”  
In the context of patents, there is an explicit link between the “natural” definition 
and property, because the natural phenomena exception to patentability defeats 
a potential property right.219  One of the justifications for the exception explicitly 
relies on the public versus private property distinction.  Although the Court has 
been careful to clarify that a patent is a unique form of private property because 
of its public purpose, and therefore not necessarily comparable to other forms of 
property,220 this caveat merely emphasizes how significant the public/private 
property distinction is with regard to patents.  Increasingly, the distinction is at 
the heart of the natural exception to patentability.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Funk Bros., patents will not be granted for discoveries of natural 
phenomena because natural phenomena “are part of the storehouse of knowledge 
of all men.”221  A person could not own them, even temporarily, because these 
things are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”222 
Adopting a property rights approach to defining “naturalness” in the patent 
context would be consistent with Myriad Genetics, but more importantly, it 
might offer a building point.  One of the issues with Myriad Genetics, and other 
decisions in its line, is the lack of a precise test or specific tools for determining 
the threshold of when human intervention tips something toward the artificial 
and away from the natural.  The result is a frustrating lack of predictable case 
outcomes. 
                                                 
 218. Michael Watts, Nature: Culture, in SPACES OF GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT: 
DECONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY’S BINARIES 142, 144 (Paul Cloke & Ron Johnston eds., 
2005). 
 219. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  A patent is, by its very nature, a private 
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 220. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining 
the intrinsic public policy of promoting the sciences and arts, making patents a unique property 
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In Myriad Genetics, the Court recites the law of nature exception and then 
explains general patent protection reasoning, specifically, the importance of 
fostering creativity and providing incentives for invention.223  In other words, 
the Court focuses on the public purpose of creating private rights.  If the focus 
shifted to more explicitly include a property framework, then the emphasis 
would be on the public rights to natural phenomena and defining the breadth of 
those rights.  The question could be re-framed as whether the proposed patent 
would infringe upon the public’s property rights in nature. 
B.  Defining “Nature” and Property Rights in Consumer Products 
Natural products are a serious business enterprise that is growing remarkably 
despite the economic downturn.224  Competitors are litigating the right to use 
designations such as “all natural” and “purely natural,” specifically because 
these product claims are valuable.225  At the same time, the product claims are 
valuable because consumers believe that they understand why these products are 
different from, and better than, others.226  Without formal definitions, dilution is 
likely, as are advertisements that will disappoint or infuriate consumers.  
Dilution of the term “natural” is not ideal for either corporations or consumers; 
if the term becomes untrustworthy, then the value inherent in the term plummets.  
From this perspective, any definition must value the consumer’s instinctual 
understanding of term. 
Additionally, the definition should take into account the costs that businesses 
may incur or avoid by using product manipulation or artificiality.  Property 
rights are, of course, the traditional method of protecting investment.227  
Businesses litigate over the natural label, not simply because it has value as a 
marketing mechanism, but because they incur costs in an attempt to be faithful 
to the designation and are frustrated when competitors claim the natural 
designation without incurring those costs.228  In other words, businesses believe 
that they are purchasing the right to designate their products as natural by 
incurring specific and substantial costs that could be avoided through the 
introduction of more elaborate methods of manufacture. In property 
terminology, there is a reliance interest. 
                                                 
 223. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Defining “nature” is a complex enterprise and one that should not take place 
informally within isolated federal domains and without reference to a broader 
consistency.  The natural designation carries with it a significant market value, 
but one that is vulnerable to the loss of consumer confidence.  Traditionally, the 
struggle of defining “nature” has been a struggle of isolating and describing the 
level of mankind’s manipulations and interventions.  This approach to defining 
“nature” allows law to reinforce an unfortunate Western cultural tendency to 
isolate man from nature.  The struggle to define “nature” has not yielded 
predictability and security in the marketplace.  The Supreme Court’s recent 
Myriad Genetics decision highlights the challenge of measuring levels of human 
intervention and manipulation.  The scales of potential intervention approach 
frustrated a system that demanded a binary answer.  To maintain consumer 
confidence in the “natural” designation and to protect the market value of the 
designation, a more consistent and thoughtful approach to defining the term is 
required.  The language of property rights provides insights and guideposts that 
may more efficiently and reliably allow us to navigate the process of formally 
defining “nature.” 
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